by the provisional Ankara government in 1922, carries a huge importance. This book could be characterised as a so-called 'geo-text', to use Sam Kaplan's recent coinage (Kaplan 2004) . He defines a geo-text as 'a book containing textual representations of territories and populations'. In view of the broad scope of the article, I will present the material in two parts. The first part of the article will outline the full content of the Hittite claim in a Turkish nationalist context. In addition to this introductory goal, I will give full weight to the historical circumstances surrounding the emergence of the Hittite trope in Turkish writing. A second plank of the article's first part will be to supply a fully-rounded intellectual and biographical background of the main propagator of the Turkist claims relating to the Hittites: Ağaoğlu Ahmed Bey, the sole author of the text of Pontus Meselesi. In the second part of the article the geo-text Pontus Meselesi itself will be subjected to a close reading and evaluated in the context of Turkish nationalism as comprehended by the geographical frame of Anatolia.
Throughout the 1930s and 1940s, Turkey's scholarly community seems to have accepted the premise of the Turkish nature of the Hittites unquestioningly. I will argue here that Anatolia, which comprised the territories conquered by the Kemalist resistance movement during the War of Independence (1919−1922) , and solidified in the articles of the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) , was forcibly turned into a homogeneous Turkish homeland by the leaders of the state of Turkey. As a corollary to this, I will contend that this form of social engineering was applied to the past as well. In other words, I will attempt to illustrate how Kemalist intellectuals utilised Anatolia's past to strengthen Turkey's present. Such an attitude could be termed 'Whiggish', in reference to Herbert Butterfield (1900 Butterfield ( −1979 who coined the phrase a 'Whig interpretation of history' in 1931 (Butterfield 1931: V− VI, 3−5) . Peter Burke describes the 'Whig interpretation of history' matter-of-factly as 'the use of history to justify the present' (Burke 1997: 1) . In this respect, the Turkish state's mobilisation of the fields of history, history writing and archaeology was of the utmost importance. The Türk Tarih Kurumu (TTK or Turkish History Foundation), founded upon Atatürk's (1881−1938) (then still known as Mustafa Kemal Paşa or simply the Gazi) personal instigation, was active in encouraging the archaeological discovery of Anatolia and in distributing its findings nationwide in the form of books, articles and pamphlets. And with regard to the Hittites, the opening of Etibank or 'The Hittite Bank', as a state-run financial enterprise on 2 June 1935 could be interpreted as an official measure that was meant to ensure that Turkish citizens would be aware of their ancient forebears even while conducting financial transactions (Etibank Kanunu 1960) . I would like to show that the origins of these strange developments can be found in the war-torn years of the early 1920s, when the negotiations at Versailles and President Woodrow Wilson's efforts to ensure the survival of small nations produced quite an impact on the people living in the area that would officially become known as Türkiye or Turkey.
In 1923, the foundation of the Republic of Turkey at the very edge of Europe led to a cultural malaise among its intellectual and political leaders alike. Established on the remains of the multi-ethnic yet staunchly Islamic Ottoman Empire, the Republic set out to emulate Western civilisation from an early date. Previously, the Ottomans had attempted to adopt and adapt various European inventions and innovations to improve their Islamic traditions and institutions, notably in the military and bureaucratic fields. The Republic's leadership, by contrast, chose to abandon the cultural idiom of Islam and to opt instead for the civilisation of the West as Turkey's structural and intellectual framework. In his argumentative book Turkey at the Crossroads, the political scientist Dietrich Jung calls the implementation of the Kemalist reform movement a 'cultural transformation of Turkish culture', which entailed the 'deliberate dissolution of Ottoman-Muslim culture'. But he then continues that this 'radical picture of the Kemalist reforms', such as is apparent in the majority of the books dealing with the subject bearing such telling titles as Phoenix Ascendant: The Rise of Modern Turkey or Allah Dethroned: A Journey Through Modern Turkey, 'served as a smokescreen to hide the continuities between Ottoman modernisation and the formation of a Turkish nation-state'. Jung calls these 'traces' a 'submerged legacy' (Jung, Piccoli 2001: VII , 61) .
In many ways, the ideological position of Turkish nationalism in the guise of the political doctrine of Kemalism was in this respect meant to replace the religion of Islam as the binding force fashioning a unitary and homogeneous state. The Republic's leadership thus decided that the Turks were to form part of the European concert of nations, rather than become identified with the predominantly Arab Middle East. In its fervour to create a more palatable historical reality for the Turks of Anatolia, free of the perceived backwardness of Islam and its Ottoman defenders, the Republican authorities did not shy away from deliberately promoting an alternate historical reality that was aimed at bolstering the supposed nationalist pride of the Anatolian population.
One of the aspirations of the so-called 'Kemalist project' could therefore be defined as the construction of a 'new' Turkish historical persona, embodied by the Hittite Empire. This persona would be unburdened of the Republic's Ottoman antecedents and disconnected from the wider world of Islam. After the Republic's foundation, Kemalist Turkey regarded the West as the locus of its destiny. The government's argumentation indicated that the Turks' past pre-figured Turkey's future. In this context, the historian Erik Zürcher's remark that the articulation of the Kemalist principle entailed the 'creation of historical myths' seems apposite (Zürcher 1993: 189) . These 'myths' were supposed to bypass Turkey's Ottoman centuries and instead concentrate everybody's attention on alternative Turkish ancestors. This policy decision culminated in the formulation of the so-called Türk Tarih Tezi or 'Turkish History Thesis' in the early 1930s. During the First Turkish History Congress at the Ankara Halkevi (2−11 July 1932), this 'Thesis' was officially presented to the nation's educational, scholarly and intellectual community.
The personal involvement of the president of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal, was of crucial importance in developing the 'History Thesis'. The contemporary historian and close personal friend of Mustafa Kemal, Âfet [İnan] (1908−1985) , recounts that the impetus the Republic's president needed to devote his full attention to the matter of history and historiography had been the racist relegation of the Turks to a secondary stage in human development by French and other European specialists. On 23 April 1930, during the sixth congress of the Türk Ocakları, an organisation inherited from the previous régime and re-established in 1924 (Georgeon 1982: 168− 215) , Âfet Hanım, as well as other members, proposed the establishment of a committee (heyet) for the scientific study of Turkish culture and history (İğdemir 1973: 3−4) . As a result, the Committee for Research on Turkish History (Türk Tarihi Tetkik Heyeti) was founded (an organisation that was to become the Türk Tarihi Tetkik Cemiyeti and eventually the Türk Tarih Kurumu or TTK). Upon Mustafa Kemal's personal instigation the Heyet's researchers then developed the so-called Türk Tarih Tezi ['Turkish History Thesis'] , which was published in a massive tome entitled Türk Tarihinin Ana Hatları (605 pages) (Behar 1996: 102−07) . In 1931, the Ministry of Education published the book's introductory part as a brochure (Methal Kısmı) (Eyice 1968) .
The authors of the Ana Hatları expound on the fact that Central Asia had been the 'original' homeland ('Ana-Yurdu') of the Turks, a notion current in the Ottoman Empire since the late 19th century. The Ottoman historian Ahmed Vefik (1823−1891), for instance, had earlier referred to the Ottomans' ancestors as having been one of the Turkish tribes living in Central Asia ('Tataristân-ı Kebir') in his textbook Fezleke-i Tarih-i Osmanî (1286 /1869 (Vefik 1286 (Vefik /1869 . Ahmed Vefik could arguably have based his words on Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall's (1774−1856) magisterial volumes, which would have been known to him. In his first volume, Hammer-Purgstall starts off with characterising the Ottomans as a Turkish tribe whose origins were in Central Asia ('Turkestan'), harking back to a remote period in history ('[c] 'est dans les siècles les plus reculées qu'il faut chercher l'origine du peuple turc, d'où descend la race actuelle des Ottomans') (de Hammer 1835: I). The Ana Hatları, on the other hand, goes a lot further, stating that, while the rest of the world was still enveloped in an intensely primitive life ('en koyu vahşet hayatı'), the Turks' ancestors had already attained a high level of civilisation. Quite literally the book claims Central Asia to have been the place of origin of human civlisation: '[t] he era which separates the stage of humanity from the stage of bestiality started here [Central Asia] in a true and obvious sense' (TTAH 1930: 49) . From here, according to the Ana Hatları, the Turks had been moving westward, in regular migratory waves across thousands of years, civilising the rest of the world in the process (TTAH 1930: 52) . Turning its attention to Anatolia or Asia Minor specifically, the Ana Hatları simply calls its early inhabitants Turks: '[t] he population of Asia Minor are Turks who have been made known with names such as Hittite and other comparable ones' (TTAH 1930: 231) . The Ana Hatları places the Republic's direct predecessors, the Ottomans and the Seljuks, on an equal footing with the Bronze Age inhabitants of Anatolia:
The state [s] (the Turkish migrants) founded, such as the Hittite, Seljuk, and Ottoman states, would be known by the name of the tribe or family that was the most powerful and that exercised government (TTAH 1930: 59−60) . These quoted sentences contain the first official endorsement of the Hittites as a Turkish ethnic group who founded a Turkish state organisation in Anatolia. The Ana Hatları refers to these prehistoric inhabitants of Anatolia with the neologism 'Eti', a Turkish alternative to 'Hittite', a term with obvious Biblical references common in numerous European languages. In the early 20th century the Ottoman authorities were aware of Hittite remains on Anatolian soil. The French architect and archaeologist Charles Texier (1802 Texier ( −1871 had discovered an impressive site near the central Anatolian village of Boğazköy in 1834 (Texier 1839 (1863− 1913) permission to excavate the site. The first excavation was undertaken under the auspices of the Vorderasiatische Gesellschaft and the Berlin OrientComité and yielded about 10,000 cuneiform tablets (Winckler 1906) . These discoveries led to the identification of the site near Boğazköy with the city of Hattusas, the capital of the Hittites.
The history textbook Büyük Tarih-i Umûmî (1328/1912) , in use during the Second Constitutional period (1908−1918) , calls these prehistoric inhabitants of Anatolia 'Hititler', in accordance with European usage (BTU 1912: I, 329−36) . Even though their material remains are visible throughout the whole of Anatolia ('Asia Minor' or 'Asya-ı Sagrâ'), the textbook rightly indicates that at the time (1912) full information was not available on this 'tribe' (or 'nation', 'kavim'), in spite of its important position in the ancient world. This was the result of the fact that the Hittite script had at this stage not yet been deciphered (BTU 1912: 329) . The Ottoman educational system during the Second Constitutional era had thus sufficed with replicating European views on matters relating to Anatolia's prehistory. The Ana Hatları's bold announcements indicate that Zürcher's above-mentioned 'historical myths' had been able to assert themselves in less than two decades (1912−1930) . As a result, one wonders about the origin of such claims and assertions. Particularly, the contention regarding the supposed Turkish nature of the Hittites seems puzzling. By contrast, scholars, such as Jørgen Knudtzon (1854 Knudtzon ( − 1917 and particularly Bedrich Hrozny (1879 Hrozny ( −1953 had argued and proven that the Hittite language belonged to the so-called Indo-Germanic (Indo-European) language group (Knudtzon 1902; Hrozny 1915; 1917 (Toynbee, Kirkwood 1926: 88) (fig. 1) .
Following the end of the First World War, the Entente powers emerged as victorious and proceeded to occupy the former Ottoman territories, including the capital Istanbul (15 March 1920) (Toynbee, Kirkwood 1926: 87; Mumcu 1982: 50) . In contrast with this apparent Ottoman acquiescence in the capital, an Anatolian resistance movement confronted foreign occupation under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Paşa. Erik Zürcher states that Mustafa Kemal was chosen to head the armed opposition by members of the secret society, Karakol, set up during the last week of October 1918 by the leading Unionists Mehmed Talat (1874 −1921 ) and Enver Paşa (1881 . In 1919 leading members of the group approached Mustafa Kemal to head the resistance movement, as his reputation was untainted. The subsequent Kemalist indoctrination and re-evaluation of Turkish history has ensured that the important role played by the Unionist movement in setting up a resistance movement has been largely ignored. Zürcher remarks that '[t]he difficulty in assessing Karakol's rôle Fig. 1 . Pontus Meselesi (2001) (source: www.ideefixe. com/kitap/) is, that most of its leading members were purged in 1926' (Zürcher 1984: 68−105; 1993: 141, 147) . The movement led by Mustafa Kemal Paşa received the name Kemalist from an early date. Zürcher remarks that 'the Kemalists were facing Great Britain, France, Italy as well as irredenta movements of Greeks and Armenians' (Zürcher 2000: 55) . After the establishment of the Republic the name Kemalism was kept in use to denote the specific type of Turkish nationalism and political ideology that was to become identified with the Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası (later, Partisi). Acccording to Suna Kili, the term Kemalism denotes the 'ideology of the 1920 Turkish Revolution'. Kili further contends that 'this Revolution comprises both the Turkish National Liberation Movement and later reforms which involved rapid and radical change of the Turkish state and society' (Kili 1969: 2, 203 (Paillarès 1922: 54, 412 ). This contemporary voice seems to strengthen the case of certain modern scholars, such as Erik Zürcher and Dietrich Jung, who see the appearance of the Republic in 1923 not as the complete break with the past, as argued by subsequent Kemalist indoctrination and propaganda, but as largely in continuation with the previous Unionist regime and contingent upon Ottoman institutions.
Mustafa Kemal drafted a document at the so-called Erzurum Congress (23 July−5 August 1919) that became known as the Misak-ı Millî or 'National Pact' (Toynbee, Kirkwood 1926: 84−85; Mumcu 1982: 39) . This sixarticle declaration pronounces the 'continued existence of a stable Ottoman sultanate and society' as the main aim of an Anatolian resistance movement (reproduced in Toynbee, Kirkwood 1926: 85−86) . On 28 January 1920, this important document was presented to the Ottoman parliament (Meclis-i Mebusân) that subsequently 'legally adopted' its resolutions in a secret meeting (Toynbee, Kirkwood 1926: 85; Jaeschke 1989: 87) . Afterwards, the Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi (TBMM) effectively managed the resistance movement and thus constituted a de facto government replacing the Meclisi Mebusân, dissolved by Sultan Mehmed VI (Vahideddin) ) on 11 April 1920 (Mumcu 1982 . The TBMM consisted of 390 members who adopted a constitution (Teşkilât-ı Esâsiyye Kanunu or 'Law of Fundamental Organisation', to use Arnold Toynbee's translation) on 20 January 1921, a legal document which replaced the original Ottoman Kanûn-ı Esâsî (23 December 1876/6 Zilhicce 1293, see Gençkaya 1876). The Teşkilât-ı Esâsiyye furthermore determined that the principle of 'popular sovereignty' ('Hâkimiyet bilâ kayd ü şart milletindir') was to embody the new government's basis of authority (Toynbee, Kirkwood 1926: 90; Mumcu 1982: 57) . Moreover, the document speaks of a 'Türkiye Devleti' (art. 3) ('State of Turkey') in the absence of an effective Ottoman government. The usage of the term 'Türkiye' to refer to the Ottoman Empire was rather common in the latter part of the 19th century. The Ankara government's adoption of the name Turkey ['Türkiye'] appears to be a tacit acknowledgement that Europe was now the determining factor in global, including Ottoman, affairs. The name 'Turkey' had been commonly used in Europe since the 16th century. In the 18th century, for instance, the periodical Mercure de France (Slatkine Reprints 1969) headed the section dealing with events in the Ottoman Empire with the designation Turquie, which would seem indicative of the popular nature of the name 'Turkey' in Europe. In 1910, the writer and educationist Kâzım Nami [Duru] (1876−1967), who was to become an ardent Kemalist, wrote that nearly everybody called the 'Ottomans' cherished homeland [Anatolia] Turkey', and that 'there is no difference in saying either "Turkey" or the "Ottoman lands"' (Duru 1999: 40) . Quite naturally, Zürcher rightly believes that Mustafa Kemal 'used "Turkey" simply as a synonym for "Ottoman Empire"' (Zürcher 2000: 59) . Significantly, the document does not mention a head of state.
The Anatolian resistance movement as represented by the TBMM was an amalgam of a great many ideological factions, with the Unionist and Islamic wings as its strongest members. The TBMM did not consist of political parties, all of its members being united under the wing of the Müdafaa-ı Hukuk Cemiyeti (Society for the Protection of Rights), led by Mustafa Kemal. Individual members did, however, not necessarily subscribe to Mustafa Kemal's principles. Jung declares that 'within the National Movement there was a strong support for constitutional monarchy' (Jung, Piccoli 2001: 59) . İhsan Güneş, on the other hand, indicates the various intellectual movements were represented in the first Meclis, the most prominent one being the populist wing (Halkçılık) he claims. Güneş further lists such groupings as a Reform Group ('Islahat Grubu'), a Unionist Group ('İttihatcı Grub') and a Group for the Defence of Sacred Institutions ('Muhafaza-ı Mukaddesat Grubu') (Güneş 1997: 153−92) . In December 1919, upon arriving in Ankara, Mustafa Kemal Paşa immediately addressed the local notables and talked to them about the difficulties facing the 'Ottoman state and people' ('Osmanlı devleti ve milleti') (Zürcher 2000: 58) . Zürcher argues that Mustafa Kemal, at the time, used the noun 'millet' in its original Ottoman meaning as denoting a religious community, and thus he seems to have been specifically thinking of the Ottoman people as 'we Ottoman muslims' (Zürcher 2000: 58) . Additional documentation can be found in a letter to the French president, Alexandre Millerand (1859 −1943 , term of office 1920 −1924 (Zürcher 2000: 59) .
The following year, after the successful conclusion of the War of Independence (Mudanya Armistice, 11 October 1922), two parliamentary decisions led to the effective abolition of the institution of the sultanate. On 30 October 1922, decision no. 307 proclaimed the demise ('İnkıraz') of the Ottoman state and the formation of the Grand National Assembly's government (Düstur 1929: 149) . In the next days, 1−2 November 1922, decision no. 308 declared that the Grand National Assembly of Turkey was the only rightful representative of governmental sovereignty in the land (Düstur 1929: 152) . As a result, the Ankara government had in this way declared the sultan an illegitimate figure, and had thus neatly separated the institutions of the sultanate from the caliphate. The Ottoman dynasty was allowed to retain supposed spiritual power over the world of Islam, but was cut off from the political life of the Anatolian Muslims. These two parliamentary decisions were not reached without difficulty however, as was forcefully recounted by Mustafa Kemal in his famous Nutûk or Speech, even issueing the threat that 'some heads will be cut off', if the 'actuality' of the Grand National Assembly's authority to abolish the sultanate were to be questioned (Atatürk 1963: 577) . Opposition to Mustafa Kemal's leadership was vocal, yet remained powerless to stop the dissolution of the Ottoman state at the hands of the Kemalist faction in the Meclis (Demirel 1994) .
The outcome of these developments was that the Ankara government under Mustafa Kemal's firm leadership could now set out to mould the ideology of Turkish nationalism into a quasi-religious force that was to provide the Anatolian Muslims with a new identity and belief-system. (Alp 1936: 31) . The publication of the book Pontus Meselesi and the Turkification of the ancient Hittites will have to be evaluated in the context of the construction and the solidification of the particular Kemalist form of Turkish nationalism. As a result, I will now provide a brief, yet detailed, account of circumstances surrounding the production of the geo-text that was to supply the Kemalist leadership with an ostensibly scholarly basis upon which to establish their ideological claims and aspirations.
As indicated earlier, Pontus Meselesi was published under the auspices of the Directorate General of Press and Information (Matbûât ve İstihbarât Müdüriyet-ı Umûmiyyesi), which was at the time headed by the wellknown figure of Ağaoğlu Ahmed Bey (1869−1939) . Ağaoğlu Ahmed was born in Azerbaijan, but went to Tiflis, Moscow and Paris to complete his studies. His academic dedication enabled him to become a leading proponent of Islamist and Turkist thinking upon his return east. Ağaoğlu was also one of the four founding members of the Türk Ocağı (Arai 1992: 74, n. 21) , as well as an ordinary member of the Unionists' Central Committee (since 1912) (Merkez-i Umûmî) (Shissler 2003: 160) . In addition, he was one of those prominent figures in Istanbul − military, political as well as intellectual leaders − exiled to Malta (Şimşir 1985) . He was released in 1921 and returned to Istanbul, where he received financial aid from Hamdullah Subhî [Tanrıöver] (1885−1966) enabling him to make his way to Ankara (Sakal 1999: 39; Shissler 2003: 165) . In Ankara, Hamdullah Subhî asked Ağaoğlu to travel to the Black Sea region and eastern Anatolia, as a member of socalled İrşad Heyetleri or 'Guidance Committees'. Ağaoğlu was to undertake this trip in order to gather support for the resistance movement, while at the same time he was also supposed to collect material evidence on the abuses that had been perpetrated by the GreekOrthodox population group. According to Stanford J. Shaw (1930 Shaw ( −2006 'advocates of a Pontus Greek state' had orchestrated 'massacres of their own to remove the Turkish population' in the vicinity of 'Trabzon' (Shaw 1977: 343) . Mustafa Kemal himself was pleased with Ağaoğlu's accomplishments and offered him the directorship (müdüriyet) of the Press and Information Office, in a telegraph dated 29 November 1921. Ağaoğlu commenced work at the Directorate upon his return to Ankara on 26 January 1922 (Sakal 1999: 39−40) . The book Pontus Meselesi appeared subsequently in the further course of the year 1338 (Pontus 2002 . The book consisted of an introductory piece (Mukaddime) and five sections presenting illustrative documentation on the atrocities committed against the Muslim population of the eastern Black Sea region (280 documents in all). As mentioned by Fahri Sakal, Ağaoğlu was then called to attend a hearing at the Grand National Assembly (Sakal 1999: 41) . At the hearing, he made the following telling statement: '[a]nd later I completed a 500-page document, a book pertaining to the Pontus atrocities in the space of a month and a half ' (quoted in Sakal 1999: 41 (Shissler 2003: 84) . For that reason, one could maintain, the young Ağaoğlu Ahmed felt at ease to write and lecture about Iran, Shi'ism and its pre-Islamic roots. His encounter with Ernest Renan, 'among the most famous Frenchman of his age', must have also impressed the young Azerî (Shissler 2003: 66−67 ).
An historian, Orientalist and social thinker, Renan was a complex figure, who brought to bear 'a quite varied influence' on Ağaoğlu (Shissler 2003: 73) . Renan was a 'deeply religious person and one convinced of the important role that religion had to play in the development and stability of a society or civilisation' (Shissler 2003: 70 ). Yet, he was staunchly anti-clerical and insisted upon the separation of church and state as 'the only sound arrangement' (Shissler 2003: 67) . One of his most famous texts must be the lecture he delivered in 1882: 'Qu'est qu'une nation? ' (Renan 1994: 17−18; Shissler 2003: 71) . This famous piece makes the following programmatic statements.
A nation is a soul, a spiritual principle. Only two things, actually constitute this soul, this spiritual principle. One is the past, the other is the present. One is the possession in common of a rich legacy of remembrances; the other is the actual consent, the desire to live together, the will to value the heritage which all hold in common.
One can very well imagine that, upon reading these lines, Ağaoğlu Ahmed Bey could not but address his own identity as a Shi'ite subject of the Russian Tsar Alexander III (1881−1894) living in the capital of the Third Republic of France (1870 France ( −1940 under its third president Marie François Sadi Carnot (1837−1894). His mentors, Darmesteter and Renan, both agreed on the fact that nationalism was not contingent upon racial or ethnic considerations. Instead they each asserted the existence of rather abstract, romantic qualities. Renan speaks of a 'spiritual principle', while Darmesteter points to the importance of cultural factors ('tradition') as determinants in his essay 'Race and Tradition' (Darmesteter 1971: 155−77) . Holly Shissler summarises that, in Paris, Ağaoğlu encountered 'a new emphasis on the nation and national spirit, linked to national historical roots and joined in a state, as the engine and prerequisite for all real advancement and progress' (Shissler 2003: 84) . These impressions were, conceptually speaking, totally new and strange notions for the young Ağaoğlu living abroad, separated from his familiar intellectual sources and inspirations. Following his return to the East, these new impressions and experiences matured to make Ağaoğlu Ahmed one of the leading thinkers in the Ottoman Empire, contributing regularly to the periodical Türk Yurdu.
After his return from Malta, he also wrote prolifically, even becoming editor-in-chief of the daily Hâkimiyet-i Milliye, the newspaper set up on Mustafa Kemal's orders on 10 January 1920. This paper thus acted as Mustafa Kemal's and the Büyük Millet Meclisi's voice, broadcasting their decisions and actions to a wider public (Bolluk 2003: 8−10) . The paper's editorials reflected the leadership's thinking on such subjects as the caliphate or the fate of the 'nation' (millet) and other current issues of interest to the resistance movement. A look at the paper's productions prior to Ağaoğlu's tenure would provide an understanding of the intellectual environment he was to become active in, before dealing head-on with his Pontus Meselesi. The anonymously published editorial 'Asrın Prensipleri ' (21 February 1920) spoke at length of President Woodrow Wilson's (1856 Wilson's ( −1924 Fourteen Points, and the way they affected the Anatolian movement (Bolluk 2003: 42−44) . The ideas expressed here could shed some light on the way in which Ağaoğlu was to try to bring his Parisian experiences into accord with the 'nationalist' and intellectual demands of the Anatolian resistance movement.
President Wilson led the US into the First World War on 6 April 1917 with the start of a general mobilisation. He delivered a speech to the US Congress on 8 January 1918, in which he put forward his proposal to ensure world peace following the eventual cessation of the hostilities (Armistice of Compiègne, 11 November 1918). Wilson's guiding principle that each 'nation' should have the opportunity for 'autonomous development' proved to be a contentious issue. His 'Twelfth Point', which deals specifically with the Ottoman Empire, was of vital importance to the Anatolian resistance.
XII. The Turkish portion of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development (Fourteen Points).
On 5 November 1918, the Allied Powers conditionally accepted Wilson's Fourteen Points as a basis for peace negotiations (Fourteen Points). The acceptance of the Fourteen Points implied a tacit acknowledgement that the former Ottoman territory of Anatolia was to be divided amongst its non-Muslim inhabitants.
The editorial 'Asrın Prensipleri' applied Wilson's principles to the case of the Anatolian Muslims to state that this kind of 'nationalist principle' ('milliyet esası') was primarily based on territorial considerations, and thus conducive to the case of the Anatolian Muslims.
Such a type of nationalist principle can only constitute a nation that relies on a population which inhabits [an area] within [established] bounds which possesses the same political and legal characteristics comprising the majority regarding its essence and basing itself on the memories of a long past, on the traditions of an old civilization (Bolluk 2003: 43) . This general exposition was followed by the announcement that ' [o] urs is also a nation whose national shape ('millî vaziyetimiz') has been determined by its borders' (Bolluk 2003: 44) . And the article continues to declare that '[t]hose people living within [our borders], irrespective of their race ('ırkları') or nationality ('kavimleri'), are counted our co-nationals ('milletdaşımız') (Bolluk 2003: 44) . The editorial employs an argumentation reliant on the legal premise of ius solis ('right of soil') as determining the conditions for citizenship, or rather 'conationality' or 'commonality' as the editorial was published before the existence of the Republic of Turkey proclaiming its inhabitants to be citizens.
The editorial's declarations seem to indicate that Zürcher's insistence that the 'national struggle' was primarily waged for the 'liberation of the Muslim population' of Anatolia, does not necessarily imply an ethnically Turkish constituency. In the aftermath of the First World War, Anatolia was home to ethnically heterogeneous Muslim groups: in addition to a large majority of Turkish Muslims, there were Kurds, Arabs, Lazes, Muslim Georgians, Greek-speaking Muslims, Albanians, Macedonian Muslims, Pomaks, Serbian Muslims, Bosnian Muslims, Tatars, Circassians, Abkhazes and Daghestanis among others (Andrews 1992). These Muslims had settled in Anatolia as refugees of the Russo-Ottoman war of 1878, and of the disastrous Balkan Wars (1912−1913) (Zürcher 1993: 171) . Arnold Toynbee's (1889 Toynbee's ( −1975 (Toynbee 1917: 5−6) . As a result, it would seem safe to state that in 1919, war was thus waged in the name of Islam to restore the Ottoman sultan and caliph, and for the benefit of the ethnically diverse Anatolian Muslims ( fig. 3) .
The editorial 'Asrın Prensipleri' was published on 21 February 1920, at a time when the fate of the Ottoman Empire had not yet been decided. For the Ottomans the First World War ended on 30 October 1918, with the signature of the Mudros Armistice after which a 'long, slow period of anxious waiting' ensued (Toynbee, Kirkwood 1926: 68) . Even though the Peace Conference convened on 18 January 1919, the Entente powers were 'pre-occupied . . . with settling the destinies of Europe' (Toynbee, Kirkwood 1926: 68; Zürcher 1993: 150−51) . In the meantime, President Wilson's Fourteen Points kept the Ottoman public in suspense as well. As illustrated, for instance, by the Wilson Prensibleri Cemiyeti, founded by Hâlide Edib [Adıvar] (1884−1964) on 4 December 1918, which argued in favour of a US mandate for Anatolia (Tevetoğlu 1991: 147−94) Such conditions were unacceptable to the Kemalists. The 'national struggle' eventually succeeded in securing the territories that had been aimed at in the Misak-ı Millî ('National Pact'), thus making the declarations in the Sèvres Treaty redundant. As a result, by the time that the Mudanya Armistice (11 October 1922) was concluded, Mustafa Kemal could claim the whole of Anatolia as the territorial body subject to the TBMM's jurisdiction. The subsequent negotiations between the Kemalists and the Allies started on 20 November 1922 in the Swiss town of Lausanne (Toynbee, Kirkwood 1926: 111) .
Ağaoğlu Ahmed had been active in Ankara since late January. As editor of the Hâkimiyet-i Milliye, he composed an article series entitled 'İhtilâl Mi, İnkılâb Mi' that was published in the period May−August 1922, when the Treaty of Sèvres was theoretically still on the cards. In these writings he partially employed an Islamic rhetoric to justify the actions of the TBMM. The article thus shows that Ağaoğlu Ahmed Bey has to be regarded as one of the major ideologues who defended and consolidated the Kemalist movement. On 10 May 1922, for instance, Ağaoğlu Ahmed wondered about the direction that the 'nation' and the 'state' ('bu millet ve devlet') were to take (Ağaoğlu 1942: 8) . He then firmly declares that the resistance movement was primarily an Anatolian movement, not necessarily reliant on Istanbul or even beholden to the Ottoman state (18 May 1922) (Ağaoğlu 1942: 24) . Praising the Anatolian people (villagers and farmers), Ağaoğlu quotes Mustafa Kemal Paşa declaring that the Anatolian villagers are the 'real owners of the land' (18 July 1922) (Ağaoğlu 1942: 57) . In this context, he also Islam' in translation (source: Dumont 1983) refers to Wilson's Fourteen Points in terms similar to the anonymous editorial, thus declaring that the Anatolian resistance movement represents a 'nation' deserving its own state and territory (28 July 1922) (Ağaoğlu 1942: 60) .
The article was thus a clear declaration of intent aimed at an internal audience. Approximately two months later, the Mudanya Armistice (11 October 1922), and subsequently the start of negotiations at Lausanne (20 November 1922), prepared the way for the actual construction and solidification of the 'Turkish nation', which was to consist of members of the diverse Muslim groups inhabiting Anatolia (Bahadır 2001). And it would appear that the Kemalist leadership also called upon the well-known Islamist and Turkist Ağaoğlu Ahmed Bey to contribute to this exercise in social engineering. As the director of the department responsible for printed propaganda (which is basically the primary task of a Directorate General of Press and Information in a war context), Ağaoğlu was asked to prepare the text Pontus Meselesi that would function as a well-documented set of arguments in book form that would disprove the claims of non-Muslim population groups on the territory of Anatolia. Ağaoğlu Ahmed's statement at the TBMM hearing indicated that the composition of the volume Pontus Meselesi carried considerable weight at the time. It would seem that the book was apparently prepared in a rather hurried fashion, as the constituent quires of the book had separate sets of page numbers ( The active propaganda efforts undertaken by the leaders of the Greek-Orthodox, or Rum, population of the eastern Black Sea littoral provided the impetus for the book's publication (Onur 2004) . The aim of the GreekOrthodox leadership was to carve out a piece of Anatolia to found a Greek-Orthodox nation state, as a so-called Republic of Pontus. In his The World after the Peace Conference Arnold Toynbee insightfully remarks that, at the time, the 'Turkish nationalists were concerned to maintain the integrity of their national territory' (Toynbee 1925: 79 Yerasimos (1942 Yerasimos ( −2005 the origins of the political activities of the GreekOrthodox community in the eastern Black Sea region had begun in earnest in 1908 (Yerasimos 1988 (Yerasimos −1989 , after the second promulgation of the Ottoman constitution (on 23 July, also known as the İlân-ı Hürriyet or 'Proclamation of Liberty'). In her Memoirs, published in 1926, Halide Edib [Adıvar] poignantly remarks that 'the whole empire [Muslims as well as Non-Muslims] had caught the fever of ecstasy' at the time (Adıvar 1926: 258) .
The name Pontus, extensively used by GreekOrthodox activists, is a reference to ancient history. After the death of Alexander the Great (301 BC), Pontus denoted a small kingdom in the northeast of Asia Minor along the southern coast of the Black Sea. The kingdom particularly flourished under the rule of Mithridates VI (Mithradates Eupator, ca 131−63 BC), until he was defeated by Pompey (106−48 BC) of Rome in 66 BC (Goloğlu 1973; TCEE) . This allusion to ancient times was obviously meant to create the impression of a continuity between the ancient Greeks living in Asia Minor following the death of Alexander the Great and the Ottoman Greek-Orthodox community resident along the southern coastline of the Black Sea.
In the course of the 1910s and 1920s, the Metropolitan of Trebizond, Philippides Chrysanthos (1881− 1949) was the foremost propagator of the so-called Pontus cause, according to Mahmut Goloğlu (1915 Goloğlu ( − 1982 (Goloğlu 1973: 247 (Cagaptay 2004: 86) . Venizelos' ploys at Versailles, on the other hand, were meant to convince the victors that the state of Greece had a right to occupy Izmir and its surrounding areas (Shaw 2000: 463−581) .
With regard to the book Pontus Meselesi, the link that Chrysanthos attempted to create with the ancient kingdom of Mithridates in his Memorandum appears significant. One can safely state that, as a result of the stature of ancient Greece and its Classical civilisation, which Greek publicists and politicians alike cunningly kept on bringing to the fore, public opinion in the West was a priori favourably disposed towards Greece, Greeks and their claims. The historian and Versailles-Treaty expert, Margaret MacMillan, laconically summarises the early 20th century public's attitudes as 'Greece was Western and civilized, Ottoman Turkey Asiatic and barbaric'. She reasons that the traditional opposition between Christianity and Islam led to an attitude at the Versailles conference table which saw the negotiations as 'a chance to win a victory in that age-old clash of civilizations', slyly referring to the paradigm coined by Huntingdon in 1993 (Huntingdon 1993 . MacMillan asserts further that the British prime minister, David Lloyd George (1863−1945, in office 1916−1922) , at the time, even compared Venizelos to Pericles (ca 495−429 BC), the propagator of radical democracy in Classical Athens (MacMillan 2003: 347−65) . In other words, the conspicuous presence of ancient Greeks in Asia Minor constituted a serious challenge to Muslim claims on 20th century Anatolia. Given their understanding of Wilson's Fourteen Points, these references to Greek antiquity must have disturbed the Kemalists greatly.
The Kemalist resistance movement operating from Ankara regarded the Fourteen Points as providing a legalistic basis for its territorial aims. In Anatolia, Kemalists understood the Fourteen Points as a declaration of a 'nationalist principle' ('milliyet esası'), inclusive of a territorial corroboration. The editorial 'Asrın Prensipleri' defines this 'nationalist principle' not just as contingent upon the presence of a clear majority share in the total population of a certain area. In addition, the editorial asserts that this majority of the population should possess 'memories of a long past'. These inhabitants should rely on the 'traditions of an old civilisation'. Woodrow Wilson did not mention these specifications in his Fourteen Points. As a lawyer turned historian, Wilson did not present proposals dealing with the concept of nationalism, proposals which nevertheless earned him the Nobel Peace Prize in 1919 (Nobel 1919) . His vision for 'the peace of the world' was supposedly based on the 'true spirit of modern democracy', and clearly not upon a theoretical and conceptual understanding of such vague notions as nationhood or nationalism. The Wilsonian understanding of the issue seems to take the existence of nationhood as self-evident, as a patent truth reflected in the numbers of population groups. The way in which the Kemalists chose to understand Wilson's position, however, seems to have been more influenced by the work of certain European, or rather French, thinkers on nationalism, the nation and the nation state. The wording employed in the 'Asrın Prensipleri' recalls Ernest Renan's 'Qu'est qu'une nation?'. In defining the qualities of a nation, Renan mentions 'the possession in common of a rich legacy of remembrances', as well as 'the will to value [this] heritage ' (Renan 1994: 17−18) . As a result, the followers of Mustafa Kemal believed that European public opinion could only be won over by presenting them with arguments which followed Renan's line of thinking, and not just by the presentation of 'facts' and 'figures', which seemed to satisfy Wilsonian expectations. In view of Greece's claims on western Anatolia, the so-called Pontus problem in the northeast presented a thorny issue that needed to be resolved quickly. The liberal atmosphere of the Second Constitutional period had led to a flourishing of the ambitions of the Greek-Orthodox population of the northeastern Black Sea littoral. Yerasimos proclaims convincingly that economic power and wealth, as was wielded by the Rum merchants and traders in the area, quite naturally led to a desire for heightened political confidence and clout. These frustrated feelings of political authority, in his view, in turn led to the emergence of armed strife and resistance to attempts at re-establishing centralised control after the downfall of the Ottoman governmental infrastructure (Yerasimos 1988−89) .
Shaw argues that after the British landing at Samsun on 9 March 1919, 'Greek bands' revolted 'openly' leading them 'to slaughter their Muslim neighbours in the hope of founding the new [Pontus] state' (Shaw 1977: 329) . In a period of approximately two years after the signature of the Mudros Armistice (30 October 1918), nearly 750 Muslims were killed by so-called Pontus gangs consisting of Greek-Orthodox extremists. In response to this unrest, the Ankara government set up a designated army unit to suppress Anatolian insurgencies against the TBMM's authority on 9 December 1920, the so-called Merkez Ordusu (Balcıoğlu 1991: 1− 10) . The TBMM placed the Merkez Ordusu under the command of the Mirliva (Major General) Nureddin Ibrahim (1873−1932) (Balcıoğlu 1991: 10−13) . At the time, Nureddin Paşa wrote down that a 'state ideal' ('bir devlet mefkûresi') was present in every 'Rum' (GreekOrthodox) inhabitant of Anatolia (Nureddin Paşa's İzâhnâme quoted in Balcıoğlu 1991: 62) . In other words, the Kemalist leadership regarded these gangs as harbingers of a possible rival government in Anatolia, a rival that was likely to receive liberal support from the erstwhile Entente powers negotiating the fate of the former Ottoman dominions in Paris. But in spite of these supposed far-reaching ideals harboured by gang members, the Merkez Ordusu was primarily engaged in collecting weapons and tracking down and disabling small armed gangs. According to Goloğlu, Nureddin Paşa flushed out all the Pontus gangs and their sympathisers by February 1922 (Goloğlu 1973: 254) . Goloğlu states that about 3,500 gang members were killed, and nearly 2,000 individuals taken prisoner. A number of gangs escaped to central Anatolia where they continued to raid the local population. In Goloğlu's opinion, they eventually joined the regular Greek army fighting the Kemalists forces (Goloğlu 1973: 254) . The fact that the Merkez Ordusu forced approximately '25,000' GreekOrthodox villagers, suspected of supporting the gangs and their assumed aims, into exile in the course of their operations seems to have been Nureddin Paşa's most significant, and arguably most controversial, accomplishment (Goloğlu 1973: 254) .
The Ankara government's response to the Pontus insurgency was thus an example of what has become known as ethnic cleansing nowadays. The term is as yet still rather illdefined (Bell-Fiakoff 1993; Petrovic 1994; Preece 2000) , but is here used to denote the forced deportation of the Rum population of the northeastern littoral of the Black Sea. This was a policy that was to receive official sanction on 30 January 1923, when the negotiators at Lausanne complied with the idea of the League of Nations' High Commissioner for refugees, Fritjof Nansen (1861−1930) , of a population exchange between the Greek-Orthodox inhabitants of Asia Minor and the Muslims living in Greece. Nansen first aired this proposal on 1 December 1922 (Zürcher 2003; Yıldırım 2006: 40) .
The propaganda tract Pontus Meselesi was part of this strife between the Greek-Orthodox and Muslim inhabitants of Anatolia. The rhetoric of Mukaddime to Pontus Meselesi was nevertheless operative on several levels. This geo-text primarily functioned as a scholarly corroboration of the Kemalist attempt to transform the ethnically heterogeneous Muslim inhabitants of Anatolia into a homogeneous Turkish nation, in addition to being a defensive tract consisting of 280 documents illustrating Greek-Orthodox atrocities. In view of the just-described Kemalist policy of ethnic cleansing in the northeastern Black Sea region, the book Pontus Meselesi was also the Ankara government's attempt to prevent that the Kemalists be tarred with the same brush as the Unionists. The Unionist leadership, which following a coup in January 1913 'was in complete control of the internal political situation', implemented a policy of enforced relocation (tehcir) of the 'entire Armenian population of the war zone to Zor [Deir-ez-Zor or Dayr-az-Zawr] in the heart of the Syrian desert' (Zürcher 1993: 115, 120) . To this effect, a 'Temporary Law of Deportation' ('Tehcir Law') was put into force on 29 May 1915, which expired on 8 February 1916 (Dadrian 1995: 224) . In the course of the execution of this Unionist policy of ethnic cleansing, numerous massacres and other outrages took place. Zürcher claims that a figure of '[b] etween 600,000 and 800,000' casualties 'seems most likely' (Zürcher 1993: 120) . At the time, the press in the West carried numerous reports on the fate of these Ottoman Christians. According to the foreign correspondent John Kifner, '[t]he New York Times covered the issue extensively − 145 articles in 1915 alone' (Kifner 2007 The sources of the documents are very varied. Some of them were communicated to the Editor directly by the writers themselves, or, in the case of private letters, by the persons to whom the letters were addressed (Blue Book 1916).
The documentation in this so-called Blue Book amounts to a veritable catalogue of atrocities committed in the name of the Ottoman government led by the Unionists. The Foreign Office, which commissioned its composition, had been in charge of the production and distribution of 'propaganda' since 'October 1915 ' (Sanders 1975 (Toynbee 1917: 5) . Publications such as the above-quoted texts and the extensive coverage the Armenian massacres received in the contemporary press ensured that the term 'genocide', created in the aftermath of the Second World War, would retrospectively be applied to the Unionists' Armenian policy. The Polish scholar and jurist Raphael Lemkin (1900 Lemkin ( −1959 (McCarthy 2001: 120) . In contrast, the Entente powers simply ignored the Ottoman's wishes and proceeded to divide the Ottoman territories amongst themselves. The Unionists, or the Young Turks as they were known in the West, received everybody's scorn and hatred as the perpetrators of unspeakable crimes and murders. Still, Ferid Paşa's actions at the Peace Conference had further 'blackened the name of the Turks' (McCarthy 2001: 121) .
Given the Unionists' posthumous reputation, the Kemalist leadership was also concerned with the West's perception of its policies and actions. The contemporary press kept a close eye on events in Anatolia. The New York Times, for example, published numerous articles dealing with the events in 'Asia Minor' at the time. In the remainder of this article then, I will demonstrate that Ağaoğlu's discovery of the Hittites as worthy forebears for the Anatolian Muslims, whom he refers to as Turks, was the outcome of an ideologically motivated reading of 19th century European accounts of ancient Near Eastern history. At the outset of Pontus Meselesi, the reader encounters the statement that the book as a whole was prepared by an impartial committee ('bi-taraf bir heyet'), arguably a reference to the so-called İrşad Heyetleri or 'Guidance Committees', based on documents ('evrak ve vesâik') its members gathered in the eastern Black Sea region (Pontus 2002 This apparently straightforward statement is a lot more convoluted than might appear at first sight. In the article's first part I put forward the contention that the War of Independence (Millî Mücadele) was fought primarily for the upkeep of Muslim independence under the banner of the Ottomans. In Europe and America, however, the Ottoman Empire was known as 'Turkey'. The terms 'Muslim' and 'Turk' had been in use interchangeably for centuries. President Wilson also spoke of the 'Turkish portion of the present Ottoman Empire' in his Fourteen Points, arguably referring to regions that were primarily Muslim in make up and character. The Anatolian resistance movement had been organised on the basis of the defence of the rights of the Muslims, as illustrated by the wording of the Misak-ı Millî or 'National Pact ' (1919) declaring that the aim of the resistance was the 'continued existence of a stable Ottoman sultanate and society'. The Kemalist use of the term millî in this context is not coincidental. This word derives from the noun 'millet', which in its original Ottoman meaning denoted a religious community or 'nation'. Mustafa Kemal and his followers were thus referring to the Ottoman Muslim community or 'nation' as their constituency (Zürcher 2000: 56) . Ağaoğlu's text, however, was written in response to the Fourteen Points and the supposed Greek-Orthodox attempts to found an independent state in northeastern Anatolia. Mustafa Kemal made a cunning move when he promoted Ağaoğlu Ahmed as Director of the Matbûât ve İstihbarât Müdüriyet-ı Umûmiyyesi on 29 November 1921. Ağaoğlu had been one of the foremost personalities of the Turkist movement in the Second Constitutional era. Zürcher claims that his thinking in Istanbul was shaped by Pan-Turkist sentiments and Islamic revivalism (Zürcher, 'Ottoman Sources': 4) . Given his earlier time in Paris, Ağaoğlu had also been exposed to nationalist ideas and notions of the benefits of the nation state. It is my contention that the groundwork for the adoption of Turkism or Turkish nationalism as the projected Kemalist state's identity was being prepared in the pages of the Mukaddime to Pontus Meselesi in 1922.
Ağaoğlu mentions Anatolia as a Turkish homeland. This Turkish homeland corresponds neatly to the territories the Kemalists had been able to conquer from the various imperialist forces (Great Britain, France, Italy, Russia). He therefore alludes to a strictly geographical definition of the term Türk, as encapsulating the nationalist aims of the Anatolian resistance movement. The above-quoted 'Asrın Prensipleri' had earlier also hinted at a geographical definition of the Kemalists' 'nationalist principle' ('milliyet esası'), without mentioning the noun Türk however. Written before the start of the Lausanne negotiations (20 November 1922), Ağaoğlu's text would appear to be one of the first printed broadcasts of the Kemalist adoption of a kind of Turkish nationalism in lieu of an Islamic definition of its constituency. In response to Greek claims on Anatolia, Ağaoğlu Ahmed's text proposes an Anatolian nationalism based on Turkism. In the 19th century certain Ottoman writers had also talked about Anatolia. These Ottomans, though, had not thought of Anatolia as a Turkish homeland, but as a regional starting point for Gazi Osman Bey (ca 1281−1324) and his successors to found an Islamic state with universal pretensions. A case in point is the Young Ottoman Namık Kemal (1840−1888), whose line that the Ottomans founded a world empire from the humble beginnings of a small tribal unit ('cihangirâne bir devlet çıkardık bir aşiretten') in his poem Hürriyet Kasidesi was renowned throughout the Ottoman world of letters (Göçgün 1999; Namık Kemal 1326: 50). In his Mukaddime to Pontus Meselesi, Ağaoğlu, however, completely abandons any talk of Ottomans or even Islamic legitimacy. The Mukaddime proposes a strictly geographical definition of Kemalist nationalism, as a concept equivalent to the mention of the territory of Anatolia. Ağaoğlu endorses the legal notion of ius solis, which had been introduced into a Kemalist discourse by the Hâkimiyet-i Milliye editorial 'Asrın Prensipleri'. Ağaoğlu Ahmed abandons an Islamic line of reasoning in favour of a secularist understanding of the term Türk as a referent to the Kemalist constituency.
As a well-known figure on Istanbul's intellectual scene associated with the Türk Ocağı during the Second Constitutional era, Ağaoğlu Ahmed was no stranger to spreading a distinctly Turkist message. Prior to his activities in Istanbul, Ağaoğlu had been active in Azerî politics for 14 years and even instrumental in organising Azerî resistance against Russian-backed Armenian aggression after his return from Paris (1894). He was forced to flee the Russian Empire, and went to Istanbul following the constitutional revolution of 1908 (Sakal 1999: 14−17) . As an Azerî exile in the Ottoman Empire, his activities necessarily involved the wider Turkic world outside the Ottoman sphere. His article series 'Türk Âlemi' in Türk Yurdu (a total of eight articles published between 1327/1911 and 1328/1912−1913) is an illustration of these interests. These pieces present various developments in the wider Turkic world, which at the time was under Russian rule. Shissler calls the article series 'a rather typical nationalist manifesto', in the sense that Ağaoğlu talks about 'Turkish Muslims' as constituting the nation in question (Shissler 2003: 173, 260− 61) . Even though Ağaoğlu was a prominent figure on the Ottoman scene, his main concern was the fate of the Turkish Muslims living in the lands of the Tsar. One could argue that Ağaoğlu's non-Ottomanist agenda led Zürcher to characterise the Azerî's thinking as PanTurkist in this period.
In the course of the First World War, the Ottoman government organised a designated army to help the Azerîs against attacks by Armenian and Russian forces. In his Mukaddime to Pontus Meselesi, Ağaoğlu was also insistent upon the ancient character of Anatolia as a Turkish homeland.
[Anatolia] has been the Turk's home country, the Turk's homeland ['Türkün öz vatanı, Türkün öz yurdu'] for thousands of years (Pontus 2002: 55) .
He thus adds a temporal dimension to his earliermentioned geographical definition of Turkism (Anatolia). In a sentence apparently directly aimed at Greek and Armenian designs on Anatolia, he continues that 'this piece of land ['bu cüz-ı memleket'] is a Turkish country that will not accept division ['tecezzi']' (Pontus 2002: 55) . These programmatic statements are followed by a paragraph that negates the importance of the Seljuk and Ottoman contributions to the development of the Anatolian Turks.
As a matter of fact, the Turks did not arrive in Anatolia with Ertuğrul Gazi or even with those who constituted the Seljuk governments. The Turkish race has been present in Anatolia since the oldest and most unknown of times. As has been illustrated by history the first inhabitants of Anatolia were Turanians (Pontus 2002: 55) .
Ağaoğlu Ahmed here employs the well-known Islamic trope of presenting history as an active participant in the development of his argument. In other words, he indicates that books written by well-respected authorities, in other words history, contain assertions of the supposed Turanian nature of Anatolia's earliest inhabitants. These Turanian Anatolians pre-dated the Rum Seljuk Sultanate (1077−1307) as well as the first presence of Ottoman tribes in Asia Minor. European audiences were familiar with the notion that the Turks had migrated into Anatolia from Central Asia as a result of the activities of the French historian and Orientalist Léon Cahun (1841 Cahun ( −1900 and his Introduction á l'his-toire de l'Asie (1896), which had apparently been 'written without reference to oriental sources' (Lewis 1968: 51, n. 1) . But here Ağaoğlu seems to be referring to a different kind of discourse, however; to a discourse related to the concept of Turan in the ancient world.
The poet Ferdowsi (940−1020) had used the noun in his famous Shahnâme ['Book of Kings'] (ca 1000), which recounts the pre-Islamic mythology of Iran. The Shahnâme contains the story of the ruler Feridun who divided the world amongst his three sons. Tur received the lands beyond the river Oxus (Amu Darya), which became known as Turan (Zimmern 2000: 27) . And according to the propaganda Manual on Turanians and Pan-Turianism (1920) , compiled by the British Naval Intelligence Division, the territory of Turan was 'approximately represented by Russian Turkestan' in the early 20th century (Manual 1920: 14) . In the second half of the 19th century, Western linguists, historians and other writers employed the term 'Turanian' as a 'loose designation of all or nearly all the languages of Asiatic origin that are neither Aryan nor Semitic' (Manual 1920: 14). The Manual elaborates further that the 'word has also been used in a racial sense with similar indefiniteness' (Manual 1920: 14) . The book Christianity and Mankind (1854), written by Christian Bunsen (1791−1860), seems to have been the first instance of such a usage of the term 'Turanian' (Manual 1920: 14) .
At the same time, Ağaoğlu's 'Turkish' contemporary, [Mehmed] Ziya Gökalp (1876 Gökalp ( −1924 also used the noun 'Turan' in a Turkish-language context. Ziya Gökalp is generally regarded as the theoretical founder of Turkish nationalism in the form of a 'cultural Turkism' as adopted by Kemalism (Parla 1985: 35) . The periodical Genç Kalemler, set up by among others Ali Canib [Yöntem] (1887 [Yöntem] ( −1967 (Arai 1992: 24−47) , provided a ready vehicle for Ziya Gökalp's writings that communicated his message. In 1910, he published the poem Turan. The last stanza of the poem proclaims Turan to be the 'grand' and 'eternal homeland' of the Turks ('[v] atan büyük ve müebbed bir ülkedır: Turan') (Parlatır, Çetin 1999: 68) . According to Taha Parla, 'Gökalp tried to create in his own words, "an ideal which existed only in the realm of imagination, not in the realm of reality"' (quoted and translated from Ziya Gökalp's Türkçülüğün Esasları Through his use of the word 'Turanian' in his Mukaddime to Pontus Meselesi, Ağaoğlu Ahmed seems to have illustrated in territorial as well as temporal terms that Anatolia is a Turkish homeland. He bases his insights on 'history', or rather on the work of universally respected authorities. The first such authority he cites is Fritz Hommel (1854 Hommel ( −1936 , and particularly his Geschichte Babyloniens und Assyriens (1888). Ağaoğlu refers to this book as containing the claim ('iddia') that the Sumerians were a race of Turanian origin ('Turanî bir asla mensub') (Pontus 2002: 56) . At the same time, Ağaoğlu also quotes Joseph Halévy (1827−1917) as representative of the opposite view that claims the Sumerians as Semitic (Pontus 2002: 56) . Abandoning the Sumerian claim, Ağaoğlu subsequently declares that the Torah ('Tevrad') and the Bible ('Kitab-ı Mukaddes') refer to a people identified as the Hittites known from Egyptian and Assyrian records (Pontus 2002: 59) .
Concentrating on the Hittites, Ağaoğlu Ahmed then refers to the Egyptologist Auguste Mariette's (1821− 1881) work, which declares that the Hittites' power and influence ('nüfûz') were clearly felt in ancient Egypt first uses the testimony of a respected French authority on Pharaonic Egypt to intimate the Hittites' stature and prowess in the ancient world. He then turns to an English missionary writing to confirm the holy scriptures. As a result, Ağaoğlu can paint a highly positive Hittite image that acts as a counterweight to the impressive depictions of Pharaonic Egypt, Assyria and Biblical protagonists.
As a result, Ağaoğlu Ahmed feels completely at ease portraying the Hittites as a world-domineering Turkish race with firm roots in Anatolia.
The area of diffusion ['intişar sahası'] of this Hittite state, that ruled over central Anatolia starting from the 16th century till the 12th century BC ['kablelmilâd'] , and later until the eighth century in northern Syria, can be determined by the monuments they have left behind (Pontus 2002: 59) .
After having established the Anatolian credentials of the Hittites, Ağaoğlu refers to the discoveries made by the earlier-mentioned Charles Texier as well as Georges Perrot (1832−1914) (Perrot, Chipiez 1892), who had been sent to Anatolia in 1861 (Pontus 2002: 59−60) . Following this allusion to the site at Boğazköy, the Kemalist proceeds to enumerate other Hittite sites throughout Anatolia. He mentions a site at 'Öyük' (Alaca Höyük), northeast ('şark-ı şimâlî') of Boğazköy, a site at 'Eflatunpınar' in the vicinity of the Beyşehir lake, and the presence of numerous monuments and inscriptions at the locality of 'Ivriz' (Pontus 2002: 60) (fig. 6 ).
Ağaoğlu Ahmed then turns anew to the site at Boğazköy, and elaborates on Hugo Winckler's abovementioned expeditions (Winckler 1906) . Even though these excavations had been undertaken on behalf of the Vorderasiatische Gesellschaft and the Berlin OrientComité, the erstwhile Young Turk turned Kemalist Ağaoğlu indicates here that the Ottoman government through the Imperial Museum in Istanbul had commissioned the enterprise ('Müze-yi Hümâyûn nâmına') (Pontus 2002: 60) . In addition to Winckler, he states that the Assistant Director of the Imperial Museum, Theodor Makridi (1872 Makridi ( −1940 , was responsible for the excavations and finds, which were transported to Istanbul and to various European museums (Pontus 2002: 60) . Makridi himself, writing in 1908, would also have it that the Ottoman government, rather than German Orientalist institutions, had been responsible for the excavations (Macridy-Bey 1908: 177−205) . Ağaoğlu emphasises the discovery of numerous cuneiform tablets at the site, and even goes on to describe this find as an 'archive' ('vesâik hazinesi') (Pontus 2002: 60) . One can assume that Ağaoğlu had here been thinking of the impressive Ottoman archive holdings that had been organised into a Hazine-i Evrâk or archive in 1846 on the instigation of Mustafa Reşid Paşa (1800−1858) (Çetin 1982: 98−102) .
The Mukaddime to Pontus Meselesi downplays the important role played by Hugo Winckler in the exploration of the archaeological site at Boğazköy (fig. 7 ). Winckler's agenda in excavating the site was in great measure determined by his own theoretical insights on the development of the ancient Near East (Winckler 1899). In Germany, he was the main proponent of the so-called Pan-Babylonian school of thought that flourished between 1900 and 1914 (Winckler 1892 , when the First World War brought an end to such purely At Iflatûn Bûnar, near the lake of Beischehr, there is a large monument of Hittite origin; and at Ivriz, near Eregli, there is a well-preserved rock-hewn monument, representing a thanksgiving to the god who gives fertility to the earth. The god wears the very dress still used by the peasantry of Anatolia; … and the tip-tilted shoes are the ordinary sandals of the country, with exactly the same bandages and mode of fastening. It is interesting also to notice that some of the patterns on the priest's dress have not gone out of fashion amongst the Cappadocian peasantry (Wright 1884: 61−62 ).
This quotation shows that Ağaoğlu had no first-hand experience of Anatolia's ambience, and that his knowledge of Hittite remains on Anatolian soil was based on the observations and judgements of European experts.
As an Ottoman intellectual of Azerî descent, Ağaoğlu Ahmed's physical knowledge of 'Turkey' or the wider 'Ottoman lands' (Duru 1999: 40) , was apparently limited to the city of Istanbul and its immediate environs. As a result, he relied on the accounts of well-respected authorities to supply him with information and arguments. Basing himself on the works of European ancient Orientalists, Ağaoğlu states that the Hittites had occupied an important position on the world stage for a period of approximately 1,000 years ('bin sene zarfında'). And that they had been the equals ('muadil') of the Egyptians and the Assyrians in that period. Then he ventures to compare the Hittites to the Phoenicians, in the sense that these two ancient peoples had constituted a link ('vasıtalık') between Europe and Asia 2 − the latter, by sea ('bahren') and the first, by land ('berrî') (Pontus 2002: 62−63). The Kemalist Ağaoğlu portrays the Hittite Empire as a worthy forebear of the Anatolian Turks, an ancestor whose material remains indicate that their state organisation and civilisation had been of the highest standard, comparable to such awe-inspiring ancient civilisations as those of Egypt and Assyria ( fig. 8) .
Ağaoğlu passes over in silence the decline of the Hittite Empire, sufficing to say that the Hittites' descendants were unable to uphold a centralised state (Pontus 2002: 63) . He then abruptly turns to the rise of Iran, and the conflicts between the Greek 'colonies' Erimtan 159 2 Writing in the second half of the 20th century, Sabatino Moscati declared that 'the civilization of the Phoenicians emerges as . . . a decisive element in the establishment of fruitful relations between the East and the West throughout the Mediterranean' (Moscati 1968: 244) . . . . since the oldest times there has been a Turanian people present in Anatolia. A great number of dynasties have ruled these people under various governments. Rum [Greek-Orthodox] and Armenians, however, arrived later in Anatolia and like the Rum on the shorelines, a number of Armenians are present in the vicinities of Van and Bitlis (Pontus 2002: 65) .
In this way, Ağaoğlu seems to have abandoned his prehistoric discourse to tackle directly the claims of the Greek-Orthodox and Armenian population of Anatolia. Ağaoğlu declares that the Greek-Orthodox population's ('Rumlar') claim that they have been suppressed under 'Turkish administration' ('Türk idâresi') is 'unfounded' ('asılsız') (Pontus 2002: 65) . It is interesting to note that the Kemalist does not speak about Ottoman administration or hegemony.
In the next instance, Ağaoğlu elaborates on the religious history of the Turks, which would indicate that the just-quoted usage of 'Türk' is racial or ethnical, rather than religious or ideological. He states that ' Ağaoğlu must have been aware of these and similar theories given his stay in Paris. The Orkhon inscriptions, which stem from the eighth century AD, had been discovered in 1889 by the Russian explorer Nikolai Mikhailovich Yadrinstev (1842−1894). The inscriptions comprise minor Chinese texts and the oldest known material in a Turkic language. They were studied in 1891 by the Russian Turkologist Vasilii Radlov (1837−1918) (Radloff 1894 (Radloff −1899 and deciphered by the Danish philologist Vilhelm Thomsen (1842 Thomsen ( −1927 in 1896 (Thomsen 1919 (Thomsen −1931 . In spite of his deeply-felt personal beliefs and his commitment to furthering the cause of Islam, in this instance Ağaoğlu follows the lead of European authorities describing the nature of Central Asian Turkic society.
Prior to writing the Mukaddime to Pontus Meselesi, Ağaoğlu Ahmed's multi-part article 'İhtilâl Mi, İnkılâb Mi' (May−August 1922) displayed a more traditional appreciation of Islam and its relationship to the population of Anatolia. On 24 May 1922, Ağaoğlu's piece states that a 'great characteristic' ('büyük sıfat') of the 'Anatolian population' ('Anadolu halkı') is its 'fidelity and devotion' ('s[a]dakat ve merbutiyet') to 'sacred institutions' ('mukaddesat'), which he then defines as 'religion, nation, the caliphate and traditions' ('din, millet, makam-ı hilâfet ve ananat') (Ağaoğlu 1942: 31) . Ağaoğlu clearly refers to Islam when talking about 'mukaddesat', as testified by his allusion to the figure of the caliph. In the same piece he goes on to explain that '[t]his struggle [the Millî Mücadele or 'National Struggle'] possesses a religious character' (Ağaoğlu 1942: 31−32) . In his Mukaddime, Ağaoğlu's exposition on the Turks' 'original national religion' ('asıl millî dinleri') as being 'shamanistic' ('şamanî') would have been tantamount to blasphemy in the eyes of conservative believers. The era before the Prophet's appearance on earth (asr-ı saadet) was after all the devr-i câhiliyye or the time of ignorance and paganism, when mankind had not been aware of Allah's will and the rewards of the afterlife. Ağaoğlu Ahmed develops a purely Turkist discourse in his Mukaddime to Pontus Meselesi, devoid of Islamic sanction or argumentation. In other words, Ağaoğlu Ahmed is consistent in pursuing a secularist definition of Turkish nationhood ( fig. 9 ).
In the following pages of his Mukaddime to Pontus Meselesi, Ağaoğlu pursues his relativistic approach to the Turks' religious history stating that 'later' ('bilahare') the Turks partially accepted Judaism and Christianity before converting to Islam. In his view this sequence of religious affiliations shows that 'Turks have always behaved in an impartial and tolerant manner ('bi-taraf ve müsamahakâr') towards various religions' (Pontus 2002: 66) . This sentence discloses that Ağaoğlu's secularist rhetoric was also meant to provide a diachronic argumentation to dispel Greek-Orthodox claims of massacres perpetrated by Kemalists in the northeastern Black Sea region. Even though Ağaoğlu composed the Mukaddime to discredit Greek-Orthodox claims on Asia Minor, and to defend Kemalist pretensions to Anatolia as an ancient Turkish homeland, he does not shy away from praising the Ottomans in the following pages. Ağaoğlu was writing before the abolition of the sultanate (30 October− 2 November 1922), and even treated the Ottoman centuries as illustrative of the Turks' alleged attitude of tolerance towards other religions.
His exposition starts off with the legendary originator of the Ottoman state:
[W]hen Osman Bey founded the new state, he did not alter the Christians' religious laws in a brave and noble [fashion] befitting his Turkishness (Pontus 2002: 66) .
This succinct sentence simultaneously conveys two important messages. The Ottomans' Turkish character ('Türklü[k]') is presented as a kind of safeguard of the tolerance and forbearance bestowed upon the Christian populations living within the borders of their state. More importantly, Ağaoğlu shows that this was no accident, but had been in place from the very start of the Ottoman existence, using the terms 'Turkish' and 'Ottoman' as synonymous. In the Second Constitutional period, the textbook Küçük Tarih-i Osmanî (1327 /1911 . 9. İvriz relief (source: Bittel 1976) In the main body of his Mukaddime, Ağaoğlu Ahmed Bey is thus able to paint a fully rounded historical picture of Anatolia as a Turkish homeland. Ağaoğlu starts off by positing the Sumerians and primarily the Hittites as the first Turkish presence in the region. And he ends his survey with the Ottomans as the last Turkish state organisation to have previously united Anatolia. In other words, Ağaoğlu suggests the existence of an unbroken continuity of Turkish rule in Anatolia from the second millennium BC right up to the 20th century with at first the Ottoman government to be succeeded by the Kemalist TBMM in Ankara (23 April 1920). As a corollary to his exposition on Anatolia's inherent Turkish nature, he also highlights the Turks' remarkable tolerant attitude towards various religions, particularly Christianity. His presentation of the first Ottoman Constitution or Kanûn-ı Esâsî as having ensured a perfect equality between Muslims and non-Muslims, could be understood as the moral of his Anatolian narrative. Ağaoğlu Ahmed effectively uses the Ottomans, and particularly their first Kanûn-ı Esâsî, as the culmination of the development of Turkish history in Anatolia, prior to the appearance of the Kemalist movement.
Ağaoğlu's unspoken claim is that the Hittites ( fig.  10) were the true precursors of the Kemalists, as representatives of the 'Turks' of Anatolia. Even though the Kemalist movement was originally conceived as a way of safeguarding the Ottoman existence, Ağaoğlu's Mukaddime to Pontus Meselesi could be seen as one of the earliest texts to intimate a break between Kemalist Anatolia and Ottoman Turkey.
Mete Tunçay's contention that the propaganda text Pontus Meselesi was the 'harbinger' for many of the claims made by the 'History Thesis' remains the only serious yet cursory attempt to contextualise this sample of the printed production of the early 1920s. Büşra Behar, in her succinct study on the development of the 'Official History' thesis, first published in 1992, remains vague about the actual sources employed by Turkey's political and historical élite in their efforts to supply the new nation state with a suitable past (Behar 1996: 17−85) . The biographer Ufuk Özcan, on the other hand, is confident in claiming that Ağaoğlu played an important part in the development of the 'History Thesis' in her monograph (Özcan 2002: 219−22) (20 November 1922) might have necessitated such a radical redefinition of the Kemalist constituency. One could argue that Ağaoğlu's use of an exclusively Turkist (secularist) discourse in his Mukaddime was in some ways connected with Wilson's Fourteen Points. They speak of nations and their right to 'autonomous development'. As a result, the characterisation of the Kemalist constituency as the Muslims of Anatolia seemed at odds with this insistence on a national rather than religious understanding of a population unit (nation). Even more important than the recognition that Ağaoğlu seems to have developed a Turkist discourse in response to perceived political pressure at the negotiation table in Lausanne, is the fact that a second layer of his rhetoric is firmly based on the actual geography of Anatolia, and on its past.
The Mukaddime to Pontus Meselesi did not just function as a defensive tract, but also offered a viable alternative to the Islamic rhetoric employed by defenders of the Ottoman cause. The Kemalist leadership's decision to invest the broad peninsula that lies between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean Sea (Anatolia) with a demographic defined in Turkist terms seems to have been primarily pragmatic in nature. Mustafa Kemal Paşa himself addressed this issue to the TBMM in the following way.
I am neither a believer in a league of all nations of Islam, nor even in a league of the Turkish peoples . . . [instead, our] government must be stable with a fixed policy, grounded in facts, and with one view and one alone − to safeguard the life and independence of the nation within its natural frontiers (Armstrong 1932: 218−19 ).
These words quoted by Harold Armstrong (1891 Armstrong ( −1943 indicate the Kemalists' distaste of either an Islamist or Pan-Turkist philosophy. Mustafa Kemal's interpretation of the TBMM's strategy as reliant on the 'natural frontiers' of the 'nation' appears telling in this instance.
The Anatolian resistance movement had been able to wrest the Anatolian peninsula away from imperialist and irredentist forces. In effect, they had forged borders which were 'none other than the armistice line of October 1918' (Zürcher, 'From') . The northern and southern edges of the 'liberated' territory were constituted by water, thus natural in the most obvious sense. The southeastern perimeter was bordered by the state of Iraq under British Mandate (25 April 1920) and the French-dominated federation of four Syrian states (Damascus, Latakia, Aleppo and Jebel Druze) (June 1922) ; and the northeastern by the newly-formed Transcaucasian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan) (March 1922) . As a result, the Anatolian territory occupied by the Kemalists was bounded by either natural or politically and militarily enforced frontiers that could not be altered. The Kemalists thus arguably exercised power over a supposed 'nation within its natural frontiers' resident in the mainland of the Anatolian peninsula. The Kemalist leadership subsequently set out to transform the ethnically diverse population of Anatolia into a 'Turkish nation'. The historian Arnold Toynbee, who had earlier vilified and denounced the 'Ottoman Government' or 'Turkey' (Toynbee 1917) , referred to Turkey as an 'almost homogeneous nation of one nationality and language and one national ideal' in his decidedly proKemalist book Turkey (1926) , written in conjunction with Kenneth Kirkwood (1899 Kirkwood ( −1968 (Toynbee, Kirkwood 1926: 147−48) . In contrast to such announcements, late 20th century opinion declared Turkey to be an ethnic mosaic rather than a uniform nation (Andrews 1992) . Erik Jan Zürcher argues that one cannot see the 'Turkish nation as a primordial entity' present in Anatolia, which emerged after a long Ottoman-Islamic slumber. Instead, he self-assuredly states that 'Turkey as we know it is not the inevitable result of a natural development but the product of acts of will on the part of ideologically motivated leaders'. These leaders did not shirk from applying a policy of 'ethnic cleansing' on a massive scale to arrive at a supposedly purely Turkish homeland (Zürcher 1998) . The Greek-Orthodox exiles from the Pontus constitute a telling example of the Kemalist policy of enforced 'Turkification'.
This exercise in social and ethnic engineering was supported by Ağaoğlu Ahmed and his Mukaddime to Pontus Meselesi. In his text, Ağaoğlu supplies the 'Turkish nation of Anatolia' with Turanian ancestors present in the area since the second millennium BC. The geo-text Pontus Meselesi inscribes the Turks (or the Hittites) on the Anatolian territory, as an intrinsic part of its ambience. In effect, in his text Ağaoğlu transforms Anatolia into the geo-body of the projected state of the Kemalist movement, to borrow the term coined by Thongchai Winichakul (Winichakul 1994) . Winichakul sees a 'geo-body' as the 'most concrete identification' of a nation (Winichakul 1994: X) . Kemalist intellectuals, and particularly Ağaoğlu Ahmed, were under strict French theoretical influence and thus tried to supply their understanding of Turkish nationhood with a fullydeveloped conceptual foundation. Ağaoğlu particularly relied on Renan's 'Qu'est qu'une nation?' in devising an alternative, Ottoman-free pedigree for the Anatolian Turk. It seems that Ağaoğlu took Renan's phrase that a nation holds 'the possession in common of a rich legacy of remembrances' to apply directly to the relationship between the Anatolian Turks and the widespread Hittite remains throughout Anatolia. One could argue that he regarded Hittite artefacts as constituting a tangible 'legacy' to the Anatolian Turks. In addition, the fact that his mentors, Darmesteter and Renan, both agreed that nationalism was not contingent upon racial or ethnic considerations, but rather on a 'spiritual principle' seems to have persuaded Ağaoğlu that his appreciation of prehistoric Anatolia was conceptually sound. In early 20th century Anatolia, Kemalists applied a policy of ethnic cleansing in conjunction with an 'enforced' Turkification as a means of constructing a homogeneous nation state called Türkiye (or Turkey). In his aptly-titled Türkleşdirme or 'Turkification' (1928) , the propagandist Tekin Alp (1883 Alp ( −1961 declares that Ağaoğlu provides the best definition of the concept of nationalism describing 'a nation' as a 'state of mind' or 'mentality' ('milliyet demek zihniyet demekdir') (Alp 1928: 46) . Tekin Alp's appreciation of Ağaoğlu's understanding of nationalism recalls Darmesteter and Renan.
Tekin Alp himself propagates the idea of a policy of assimilation to transform non-Turks into Turks ('intıbâk'), and in order for this drastic application of social engineering to succeed he refers to Ziya Gökalp to indicate that 'culture and education' ('terbiye') should be the main factors in bringing about a complete 'Turkification' (Alp 1928: 34−45) . According to Zürcher, the wholesale adoption of this policy led to the 'forced assimilation of the 30 percent or so [of the population] which did not have Turkish as its mother tongue' (Zürcher, 'From') . Ağaoğlu approaches the population of ancient Anatolia in much the same way. As his Turkism was not racially or ethnically inspired, he declares that the Hittites who had entered Anatolia at the end of the third millennium BC were Turks as they had appropriated the 'state of mind' of Anatolia. In the Mukaddime to Pontus Meselesi the early 20th century Turkish geo-body thus constitutes the abstract quality of Türklük (Turkishness) in the past. One could argue that Ağaoğlu regards the Hittites as Turks by mere virtue of the fact that the 20th century population of Anatolia was supposed to be Turkish. He justifies his reverse logic by means of references to numerous 19th century European scholars whose usage of the terms 'Turan' and 'Turanian' seemed to prefigure the Kemalist appreciation of Anatolia.
In a broadly-speaking Ottoman intellectual context, Ağaoğlu's use of 'Turanlı' necessarily pointed to Ziya Gökalp's theories, which all but reinforced his reverse logic. In the article 'İnkılâpçılık ve Muhafazakârlık', published on 17 May 1339/1923 when the negotiations at Lausanne were still under way, Gökalp seems to have adopted Ağaoğlu's reverse logic with regard to the Hittites and various other ancient peoples (Gökalp 1980: 38−42) . Taking his well-known distinction between a national 'hars' ('culture') and an international 'medeniyet' ('civilisation') as his starting-point, Gökalp characterises the Ottomans as purely Oriental ('şark'); and the new Turkey as Western ('garb') through the Kemalists' adoption of European civilisation while safeguarding Turkish and Islamic culture (Gökalp 1980: 39) . Following this assertion, Gökalp states that European civilisation is the continuation ('devam') of the ancient ('kadim') Mediterranean civilisation (Gökalp 1980: 40) . And following a similar kind of reverse logic, he claims that '[t]he first inhabitants of western Asia were the Turks', thus insinuating that current European civilisation is nothing but the outcome of ancient Turkish ingenuity. Ziya Gökalp provides a list of ancient peoples with Turanian roots ('Turanî'), such as the Sumerians, the Alanians, the Scythians and, significantly, the Hittites (Gökalp 1980: 40−41 (Bahadır 2001: 142) . In contrast to this statement, a look at the book Pontus Meselesi and its impact on the intellectuals associated with the Kemalist movement shows that a 'Turkish nationalist discourse' was being developed in Kemalist circles from approximately September−October 1922. The Turkist claims developed by Ağaoğlu seem to have prepared the intellectual ground for the creation of the Republic of Turkey as a Turkish homeland, in the past as well as in the present.
On 29 October 1923, the TBMM declared the republic to be Turkey's form of government. In Zürcher's view, this was 'really the result of a coup d'état by a radical wing within the movement for the defence of national rights led by Mustafa Kemal Pasha' (Zürcher 1998) . Subsequently, the new state's leadership began the construction of a Turkish homeland on the peninsula between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean Sea (Anatolia) in earnest through its active propaganda efforts and social engineering. In the early years of the Republic, Ağaoğlu Ahmed Bey's contention that the Hittites had constituted the earliest Turkish presence in Anatolia was not enthusiastically received. At the time, the Maarif Vekâleti (Ministry of Education), founded in 1923, published Dr Rıza Nûr's (1879 Nûr's ( −1942 massive Türk Tarihi (12 volumes) (Nûr 1242 (Nûr −1244 . The third volume deals solely with the history of Turkey ('Türkiye Tarihi'), a topic which receives a rather idiosyncratic interpretation at his hands (Nûr 1242 −1244 : III, 1342 /1924 . Rıza Nûr regards the Seljuks and the Ottomans as one dynastic continuum, and he even displays his Pan-Turkist proclivities by means of the declaration that the original Seljuk state had stretched from China to the Mediterranean, and from the Aegean to the Black Sea (Nûr 1242 −1244 . Rather than looking at ancient peoples resident in Anatolia, Rıza Nûr sees the Republic's dynastic predecessors as the originators of the concept of a Turkish state on Anatolian soil.
[The Sultanate of Rum] . . . is the essence of the state that has continued up to today under the name of Turkey. In other words, the nation is still the same nation, the state is still the same state (Nûr 1242− 1244: III, 57−58).
Nûr sees the republican government under its first president, Gazi Mustafa Kemal (1923 Kemal ( −1938 , as the rightful heir to the Ottoman-Seljuk throne.
The Republic's educational establishment did clearly not adhere to Ağaoğlu's discovery of the Anatolian Turks' original forebears. Schools in early Republican Turkey received a revised version of the multi-volume history textbook used under the previous Ottoman administration, the Büyük Tarih-i Umûmî. The revised edition received the seemingly simpler title Umûmî Tarih (UT 1926) . The sections dealing with the ancient Near East consider the civilisations of Egypt, Assyria and Chaldaea, the Phoenicians, the Hittites, the Iranians and the Hebrews (UT 1926: 5−106) . With regard to 'Turkey', the textbook starts out with the contention that the Hittites, whom the book refers to as Eti in this revised version, had migrated into Anatolia from Asia. Following this introductory statement about their migration into Anatolia, the textbook adds the following telling statement: '[t]heir origins have till now been assumed ['zann'] to be Turanian' (UT 1926: 70) . The Umûmî Tarih explains that this surmise ('zann') had been current as a result of the fact that the Hittite script had at the time been unintelligible. But now that this scientific hiatus has been partially bridged (an obvious reference to the work done by Hrozny) the textbook self-assuredly proclaims that the Hittites did not belong to the Turanian race ('Tûran ırkına mensûb olmadıkları anlaşıldı') (UT 1926: 70) . The Umûmî Tarih was even reprinted in 1928 (UT 1928). As a result, Ağaoğlu Ahmed Bey's claim that the Hittites were the real forebears of the Republic of Turkey did not seem to have wide currency in the course of the new state's first decade.
As outlined in the first part of this article, in 1930 the publication of Türk Tarihinin Ana Hatları marked a dramatic change in the official perception of the Anatolian Turks' past. In the period preceding the official proclamation of the 'History Thesis', the Kemalist government had been occupied with the implementation of a whole range of Westernising measures (the so-called İnkılâb). In the period between 4 March 1925 and 4 March 1929, the Takrir-i Sükûn Kanunu ('Law of the Maintenance of Order') was in effect. This meant that Turkey was governed by an emergency legislation during these four years (Zürcher, 'From') . The contemporary Halide Edib [Adıvar] , who had also taken part in the War of Independence (Adıvar 1928) , says that the 'Law of Maintenance of Order . . . re-establish[ed] Revolutionary tribunals, with absolute power to arrest and execute anyone suspected of endangering the public order' (Adıvar 1930: 220) . These so-called 'Revolutionary tribunals' or İstiklâl Mahkemeleri had originally been legally founded on 26 September 1920, in the midst of the ongoing war against foreign occupiers (Aybars 1975) . In those four years the most drastic reforms were introduced by the government. These reforms were supposed to transform Turkey into a new country, into a new European nation. Halide Edib further matter-of-factly characterises the Kemalist state during these years as the 'Turkish dictatorship' (Adıvar 1930: 258) . These drastic reforms, such as the abolition of the caliphate and the Islamic Şeriat (3 March 1924) and its replacement by the Türk Medenî Kanunu, based on the Swiss Code Civil (4 October 1926), and the introduction of a new Latin-based alphabet (1 November 1928) , were carried through by means of 'terrorist methods', as phrased by Halide Edib (Adıvar 1930: 223) . She goes on to say that '[p]opular opposition to any measure of which the army approved . . . would have been useless' (Adıvar 1930: 234) .
These drastic measures ensured that the Anatolian Turks were cut off from their own past by the end of the 1920s. Halide Edib says markedly that '[t]he continuity of Turkish culture has been abruptly broken' as a result of the İnkılâb reforms. Now the graver danger of being cut away from the Turkish culture of the past is looming on the horizon. The new generation rising within the next 20 years will be as strangers in the country and to its past (Adıvar 1930: 235) .
The Kemalist one-party state did seem to have such a development in mind. Ağaoğlu Ahmed Bey's presentation of an alternative Anatolian past in 1922 gave the Kemalist leadership the opportunity to rewrite the history of the Anatolian Muslims or Turks once the state had been firmly established and the population thoroughly pacified.
The Kemalist leadership pushed the Ottomans to the margins of society, as predecessors tainted by their association with Islam as a non-nationalist and instead universalist creed. The ideological position of Kemalism advocated an ostensibly secularist value system, and presented the Anatolian Turks with a territorially based form of nationalism throughout the 1920s. The authorities implied that Turkish nationalism was centred on the mainland of Anatolia. Ağaoğlu Ahmed Bey's propaganda tract Pontus Meselesi contained the nucleus of the 'History Thesis' to be developed in the course of the 1930s. According to Soner Cagaptay, the 1930s, however, saw the appearance of a racially inspired nationalism in Turkey, a form of nationalism that went in tandem with the outrageous claims of the 'History Thesis' which transformed the Turks into the 'race' (ırk) at the root of human civilisation and language (Cagaptay 2004: 86−101) . The authorities regarded the Hittites as a new race which had entered Anatolia. These prehistoric immigrants formed a new population of Turkish stock which supplanted the local, less-developed inhabitants of Asia Minor.
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On a purely conceptual level, removed from the viscidities of human relations, Kemalist nationalism denoted, and still denotes today, a different understanding of Turkish nationality or Türklük, formally grounded in the concept of ius solis. Kemalist nationalism holds, in theory, that every citizen of the state of Turkey, resident within its borders is a 'Turk' (or a Turkish citizen) (Yeğen Summer 2002: 200−17) . The 88th Article of the Republic's first Constitution (Teşkilât-ı Esasiye Kanunu), accepted on 20 April 1340/1924, leaves no doubt about this.
The name Turk, as a political term, shall be understood to include all citizens of the Turkish Republic, without distinction of, or reference to, race or religion (Earle 1925: 98) . This legal attitude is the outcome of the state's appropriation of Ziya Gökalp's understanding of Turkism as primarily cultural in nature. In fact, this appreciation of Turkism appears very close to the ideological position of Ottomanism, propagated in the Ottoman Constitution, or Kanûn-ı Esâsî, of 1876. The Constitution's 8th Article declares that, All subjects of the empire are called Ottomans, without distinction whatever faith they profess; the status of an Ottoman is acquired and lost according to conditions specified by law (Gençkaya 1876; see also Ubicini 1877: 23).
In other words, people living within the Ottoman borders were deemed Ottoman citizens or Ottomans irrespective of ethnic background or religious creed. In the Republic of Turkey the issue of religion is also officially ignored. The Treaty of Lausanne deals only curtly with the issue of minorities or 'non-Moslem nationals of Turkey' (Earle 1925: 83) . The state of Turkey assumed that minorities would be absorbed into the mainstream Turkish population as fellow-citizens or fellow-Turks with equal rights and duties. And, officially Islam was shunned as tantamount to professing allegiance to the Ottoman sultan-caliph. Nevertheless, on a grass-roots level every Turk was also expected to be a Muslim. In other words, in conjunction with its geographical limitations, Turkish nationalism also adhered to a religious categorisation as the main determinant in ascribing nationality to its citizens. This situation remains valid till today. The academic and commentator Ahmet İnsel, writing in the daily Radikal, argues that Islam ('Müslümanlık') is one of the 'main arteries' which 'nurture' nationalism in Turkey. He further remarks that the general population of Turkey has always based its sense of personal identification and social coherence on religious ('dini aidiyet') rather than ethnic factors. And reasons that such a situation persists today as well (İnsel 2005) . The fact that the newlyestablished Republic, after abolishing the caliphate in 1924, set up a Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyânet İşleri Reisliği) on 3 March (Law No. 429) to administer the nation state's spiritual needs appears significant (Jäschke 1966: 181, Diyanet) .
This view of Turkish nationalism in the Republic of Turkey parallels the development of Ottomanism in the early 20th century. Following the Balkan Wars (1912− 1913) , the Ottomans lost most of their territory in Europe, which led to more waves of Muslim migrants fleeing into Anatolia. As a result, the Unionist understanding of Ottomanism or Ottoman citizenship became contingent upon Islam. Zürcher laconically establishes that the 'vast majority [of the Ottomans], certainly of the Unionists . . . subscribed to a kind of Ottoman Muslim nationalism' following the Balkan Wars (Zürcher, 'From'; . As already mentioned, Arnold Toynbee had in 1917 pointed to the Ottoman government policy of settling Muslim 'Mouhadjirs' in Anatolia, and he at the time even predicted that 'they [were] probably destined to be absorbed' into the mainstream of the Muslim population of Anatolia (Toynbee 1917: 12) . The Ottoman government's willingness to accommodate a heightened Muslim demographic definition of its territories even seems to have entered into the stipulations of the Treaty of Constantinople (29 September 1913), which brought an end to the Second Balkan War (16 June−18 July 1913). The first of the added Protocols (No. 1) specifies 'the optional and mutual exchange of Bulgarian and Moslem populations'. In spite of the supposed 'optional' nature of the exchange, the Protocol further adds that the 'exchange shall take place by entire villages' (Treaty 1913: 37) . In addition, the Unionists also seem to have adopted a plan to deport the GreekOrthodox population of Anatolia (Pentzopoulos 1962: 55−56) . The then Greek prime minister, Venizelos (1910 Venizelos ( −1915 , 'was [thus] forced to accept' an Ottoman proposal which envisioned the 'exchange of the [GreekOrthodox] rural population of the Smyrna region against the Moslem minority of Macedonia'. The outbreak of the First World War in 1914 prevented the realisation of this scheme (Pentzopoulos 1962: 56) . In his earlier-quoted text of 1917, Toynbee argues that the 'Armenian "Deportations", which followed Turkey's intervention in the war' were also effected 'under the flag of religion' (Toynbee 1917: 28−29) . The Unionists thus seem to have been motivated primarily by their espousal of a kind of Muslim Ottomanism, as a way of safeguarding the continued existence of the Empire unified under the aegis of the sultan-caliph, Mehmed V [Reşad] (1909 [Reşad] ( −1918 .
The Kemalist construction of Turkish nationalism or nationhood became equally reliant on the numerous Muslim immigrants now living in Anatolia, as a result of the influx of the 'Mouhadjirs' and the Unionist policy of Muslim settlement (McCarthy 1996; Dündar 2001) . Fuat Dündar, speaking with the journalist Talin Suciyan on 16 April 2006, stated that the Unionists 'left a very "adequate" population composition to Mustafa Kemal' and the Republican authorities. Dündar elaborated that 'a more harmonious population composition was created' as a result of the Unionists' adoption of Muslim Ottomanism in their attempt to forge a homogeneous territorial unit in Anatolia (Dündar 2001) . The further development of nationalism in Turkey, however, moved away from a purely territorial understanding of the notion of Türklük. Already in the above-quoted 88th Article of the Turkish Constitution (1924) an indication of this evolution seems prefigured: '[e]very child born in Turkey, or in a foreign land of a Turkish father . . . is a Turk' (Earle 1925: 98) . This confusion paved the way for the conceptual construct of Turkish nationalism becoming subject to racial (ethnic nationalism) rather than cultural factors (civic nationalism). From adhering to the French model of nationalism, contingent upon a territorial argumentation (ius solis), Turkish nationalism evolved into German-style nationhood based on ethnic homogeneity (ius sanguinis) during the 1930s and 1940s (Poulton 1997) .
The Republican leadership's attempt to disconnect the Turkish citizens from their Ottoman past led to an official search for an alternate historical reality that was supposed to bolster the alleged 'nationalist' pride of the Anatolian population. Based on Ağaoğlu Ahmed's misguided claims, the TTK and other proponents of the 'History Thesis' were hard at work to establish the Hittites as worthy Anatolian forebears of the Republic of Turkey throughout the 1930s and 1940s. Due to the development of racial theories in the 1930s, the Hittite Empire as the true forebear of the Republic of Turkey became a prehistoric ethnically Turkish state organisation in the minds of Turkey's leadership and its wider population. The Türk Tarihinin Ana Hatları significantly speaks about the 'Turkish race' ('Türk ırkı'), and how this race had civilised the rest of humanity in the course of their migrations. The Hittites, as an ethnic sub-group of the wider Turkish race, had migrated to Anatolia where they set up the earliest Turkish state structure in an Anatolian context (TTAH 1931: 8−9) . The active archaeological programme propagated by the Türk Tarih Kurumu throughout the 1930s and 1940s supported and sustained the official belief that Anatolia's prehistory had been a purely Turkish affair, a conviction that can still boast its proponents today. These rather fanciful ideas about the nature of prehistoric Anatolia and its population originate in Ağaoğlu Ahmed's contribution to the propaganda efforts of the provisional Ankara government in its concern to create a Turkish homeland in early 20th century Anatolia, a homeland which was unencumbered by the presence of either ethnic or religious minorities. Anatolia's present was supposed to be purely Turkish, and similarly, the Republican leadership also perceived Anatolia's past as a solely Turkish entity. The ethnically divergent Muslim population of the Anatolian peninsula received a new Turkish identity in the 1920s that was to form the basis of Republican citizenship throughout the 1930s and beyond.
